Putting an end to all the speculations and
allaying the fears of millions of patients across the world, Supreme Court of
India, on Monday, rejected the application of Novartis in the matter of the
patentability of its cancer drug Glivec. Novartis had filed a patent
application for the beta crystalline form of its drug Imatinib Mesylate (It is
a therapeutic drug for chronic myeloid leukemia and certain kinds of tumours
and is marketed under the names “Glivec” or “Gleevec”) claiming better
bioavailability with the Indian Patent Office. The IPO had rejected the
application on the ground of lack of efficacy under Section 3(d) of the Indian
Patent Act. The same was challenged before the IPAB, which upheld the decision
of the patent office. And Novartis, instead of approaching Madras High Court
had directly approached Supreme Court against this decision. It had also
challenged the validity of Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act. Hon’ble
Supreme Court in its decision has considered the case de novo and has given a detailed decision running to
112 pages, discussing in detail the patent in question and also the meaning and
scope of the term ‘efficacy’ and Section 3 (d).
Supreme
Court addressed Section 3(d) as the second tier of qualifying standards for the
chemical substances and pharmaceuticals in particular in order to leave the
door open for true and genuine inventions but, at the same time, to check any
attempt at repetitive patenting or extension of the patent term on spurious
grounds. The Court pointed out that,
"if clause (d) is isolated from the rest of section 3, and the legislative history behind the incorporation of Chapter II in the Patents act, 1970, is disregarded, then it is possible to see section 3(d) as an extension of the definition of “invention” and to link section 3(d) with clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1). In that case, on reading clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1) with section 3(d) it would appear that the Act sets different standards for qualifying as “inventions” things belonging to different classes, and for medicines and drugs and other chemical substances, the Act sets the invention threshold further higher, by virtue of the amendments made in section 3(d)"
It was pointed out that, the test of efficacy in the context of section 3(d) would be different, depending upon the result the product under consideration is desired or intended to produce. In other words, the test of efficacy would depend upon the function, utility or the purpose of the product under consideration. Therefore, in the case of a medicine that claims to cure a disease, the test of efficacy can only be therapeutic efficacy. The Court pointed out that the “therapeutic efficacy” of a medicine must be judged strictly and narrowly. It was laid down by the Court that the explanation to Section 3(d) indicates what is not to be considered as therapeutic efficacy. Though the Court considered in detail the opinions given by Mr. Anand Grover and Prof. Basheer on the scope of the term ‘therapeutic efficacy’, the Court left the question open for the future courts to decide.
"if clause (d) is isolated from the rest of section 3, and the legislative history behind the incorporation of Chapter II in the Patents act, 1970, is disregarded, then it is possible to see section 3(d) as an extension of the definition of “invention” and to link section 3(d) with clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1). In that case, on reading clauses (j) and (ja) of section 2(1) with section 3(d) it would appear that the Act sets different standards for qualifying as “inventions” things belonging to different classes, and for medicines and drugs and other chemical substances, the Act sets the invention threshold further higher, by virtue of the amendments made in section 3(d)"
It was pointed out that, the test of efficacy in the context of section 3(d) would be different, depending upon the result the product under consideration is desired or intended to produce. In other words, the test of efficacy would depend upon the function, utility or the purpose of the product under consideration. Therefore, in the case of a medicine that claims to cure a disease, the test of efficacy can only be therapeutic efficacy. The Court pointed out that the “therapeutic efficacy” of a medicine must be judged strictly and narrowly. It was laid down by the Court that the explanation to Section 3(d) indicates what is not to be considered as therapeutic efficacy. Though the Court considered in detail the opinions given by Mr. Anand Grover and Prof. Basheer on the scope of the term ‘therapeutic efficacy’, the Court left the question open for the future courts to decide.
It was
also highlighted by the Court that, since the grant of the Zimmermann patent,
the appellant has maintained that Imatinib Mesylate is part of the Zimmermann
patent and had also obtained the drug approval for Gleevec on the basis. The
U.S. Board of Patent Appeals, in its decision granting patent for the beta
crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, had proceeded on the basis that
Zimmermann patent had the teaching for the
making of Imatinib Mesylate from Mesylate and for its use in a
pharmacological composition for treating tumors or in a method of treating warm
blooded animals suffering from tumoral disease.
On the basis of these reasons the Supreme Court pointed out that the
argument of developing Imatinib Mesylate from Imatinib is out of the scope of
Zimmermann Patent is not valid and hence fails to satisfy the conditions for
constituting an invention under the scope of Indian Patent law.
The Supreme Court Judgment may be accessed here


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